

REPORT OF THE STRATEGY SEMINAR AND ADVOCACY WORKSHOP

Ecumenical No-Nukes Network of the World Council of Churches

NUCLEAR DANGERS AND JUST PEACE?

Introduction and Acknowledgements	2
Session Notes for Strategy Seminar “Reframing the Debate”	3
Session 1 – Link Security Threats Related to Climate Change, Energy Trends and Nuclear Arms 3 <i>William Walker</i>	
The Issue in the Light of Faith [with each seminar session] <i>Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, Rosalee Velloso Ewell</i>	7
Session 2 – Delegitimize Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: Exposing Myths, Embracing Human Security and Humanitarian Law <i>Ward Wilson</i>	9
Session 3 – Revive the Moral Imperatives, Together <i>Tim Duffy and Steve Hucklesby</i>	10
Session 4 – Security in a Nuclear-weapon-free World, What Needs to Shift Now? <i>Ernie Regehr</i>	13
Session Notes for Advocacy Workshop	15
Session 5 – Orienting Ourselves: Current Plans, Strategic Positions and Shared Potential	15
Session 6 – Assessing Ourselves: Building Capacity within a Networked Approach	17
Sessions 7 and 8 – Member and Network Advocacy: Partnerships and Planning for Specific Steps Forward	21
Resource Materials	25
Appendix	26
The Issue in the Light of Faith – in conjunction with Sessions 1 – 4 <i>Tyler Wigg-Stevenson</i>	26

Introduction and Acknowledgements

The seminar and workshop gathered resource persons and members of the Ecumenical No-Nukes Network of the World Council of Churches at the Gillis Centre in Edinburgh, Scotland. The meetings were conceived by participants in the International Ecumenical Peace Convocation in Kingston, Jamaica, in mid-2011, and organized as a follow-up measure, taking place on 14-18 November 2011. The purpose was to develop elements of a common advocacy agenda for use in church and multi-faith initiatives to build support for steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

The seminar focused on reframing some of the main themes in the debate over nuclear weapons and relating those themes to ecumenical policy against nuclear weapons. Each theme was intended to be examined in the light of faith and also to be evaluated from a 'just peace' perspective.

The aim of the workshop was to increase understanding of complementary roles and common goals, and to assess ecumenical advocacy capacity, in a broad, ecumenical context. It aimed to increase awareness and collaboration on specific steps forward, including toward milestones in 2013.

On behalf of the small organizing team and the WCC secretariat, sincere thanks are due to all who contributed with knowledge, experience and wisdom, including: the special guests, His Eminence Keith Patrick Cardinal O'Brien, Archbishop of St Andrews and Edinburgh; the Right Rev Alan McDonald, former moderator, Church of Scotland; the Hon. Bruce Crawford MSP, Cabinet Secretary for Parliamentary Business and Government Strategy, and co-conveners and members of the Cross-Party Group in the Scottish Parliament on Nuclear Disarmament; the presenters, William Walker, Ward Wilson, Tim Duffy, Ernie Regehr, Tyler Wigg-Stevenson and Rosalee Velloso Ewell; for leading daily meditations, Rev Mitchell Bunting, Iona Community and Edinburgh Churches Together; for hosting, facilitation and orientation, David Bradwell, Church of Scotland; for participants who served as moderators, respondents and note-takers, Jordan Blevins, Kim Yong-Bock, Marie Dennis, Pat Gaffney, Steve Hucklesby, Cesar Jaramillo, Jeong Suhui, Fr Paul Lansu, Peter Mbae Njogu and Susi Snyder; and, finally, for conceiving and planning the meeting, Steve Hucklesby of the Methodist/United Reformed Church/Baptist Churches joint advocacy office, and Susi Snyder and Peter Paul Ekker of IKV-Pax Christi in the Netherlands.

A participatory approach was taken in both seminar and workshop using informal presentations, questions and discussions. In addition, all participants served as moderators, respondents or note-takers. Variations in the style and length of session notes reflect this collective effort, as do any discrepancies between the contents of this report and the views expressed by presenters and participants.

Session Notes for Strategy Seminar

Session 1 – Reframing the Debate: Link Security Threats Related to Climate Change, Energy Trends and Nuclear Arms

Presenter: Dr William Walker, professor, St. Andrew's University, Scotland

The session began with a discussion of the paper “Climate Change, Nuclear Risks, and Nuclear Disarmament” (Jürgen Scheffran et al, World Future Council, 2011) The paper outlines the connections between nuclear weapons, nuclear power generation and climate change. It proposes that a vicious cycle or a virtuous cycle may emerge from the interactions between the three, but that we are trapped in a vicious cycle:

- Nuclear power can lead to capabilities for nuclear weapons.
- Climate change leads to a desire for carbon dioxide avoidance, which leads in part to nuclear power.
- Climate change can also lead to conflict, which can lead to the usage of nuclear weapons.

The three issues form a kind of triangle, Walker suggested. In the center of the triangle are political power plays and economic growth and opportunities. The study argues for the need to turn toward a virtuous cycle with an integrated strategy – to move toward sustainable lifestyles and livelihoods, and to build sustainable peace.

Questioning the interconnections. While there are certainly connections between climate change and nuclear power, Walker raised a number of questions. For example, is climate change likely to increase the investment in nuclear power? And, does nuclear energy use lead to carbon dioxide reductions?

- The background paper suggests that nuclear power can't provide a solution to carbon dioxide emissions – electricity is a minor part of global energy supply
- The argument in favor of nuclear power is that it at least provides a contribution, and all contributions are needed, and without investment in nuclear power, carbon emissions will be worse
- Walker believes that what will happen during this nuclear 'renaissance' will be similar to the 70s – only a few countries will actually acquire nuclear power plants, largely for economic reasons because of high costs to build the plants.

What about the relationship between nuclear energy use and nuclear weapons?

- Background paper argues that nuclear energy use and technology generates options for the development and spread of nuclear weapons.
- Research suggests that this is not always the case – in some cases it does, and in some it does not. There is not necessarily causation. There is a risk, but the issues are not simple and every case is different. Most states with nuclear energy technology have not become proliferators. Diffusion of nuclear materials and expertise from commercial to military purposes is relatively rare.

Focus on nuclear-weapons states and on overall questions of power. Keep the focus on the nuclear weapon states. They are really the heart of the nuclear issue and have been the main source of nuclear proliferation— including UK to US; FR to IL; RU to CI; CI to PK; PK to LY, IR and NK.

Illicit trade and criminality are a second potential vector for proliferation.

Expanding the threat analysis to include climate change and nuclear energy could result in a lack of focus on the real causes. The links are limited:

- The strongest connection is that countries may use pursuit of nuclear power as a smokescreen for pursuing nuclear weapons (alleged in the case of Iran).
- The link that is the most unconvincing and that raises the biggest question is the link between climate change, increased conflict and nuclear weapons. There isn't enough research or evidence about the effect of climate change on the behavior of states. Is it strong enough or clear enough to show that climate change leads to migration, poverty and resource losses and then, in turn, to internal instability and conflict?

If one wants to focus on the connections between these three sectors, then focus on factors that shape all three, for example:

- Factors of unequal economic growth and uneven development are at the center of the triangle, shaping all three sectors, according to Walker.
- It is economic growth that is taxing energy supplies, and producing the call to invest in nuclear power plants.

Another general explanatory factor is the appetite for national power, the pursuit of national power, or the fear of a rival's power. This drives proliferation.

- Until conflicts in places like the Korean peninsula and the Middle East are resolved, the push for and desire for nukes will continue. These are regions where WMDs are likely to remain in play.
- Regional and global rivalries drive proliferation. Strategy rationales and historical analyses may both indicate:
 - The value of hanging onto nuclear arms in order to keep peace between the big powers.
 - That nuclear arms provide a reasonably stable framework within which great powers can address (other) major problems. Hence, at least a low level of deterrence is kept.
- The rise or fall of great powers tend to be violent periods historically.
 - Is the US or Japan likely to give up nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence in the face of a rising China? Difficult to imagine.

“Transformation” is an important concept in the paper. It has to come through gradual improvement – it is not a one-off phenomenon or a sudden-breakthrough achievement .

Transformation requires successive steps over a period of time:

- Fundamental changes in values and systems.
- Working toward gradual improvements. Examples involving both processes of change:
 - building up cooperative behaviour in order to move toward more effective international governance;

- understanding that the search for justice is a matter of securing better justice and greater justice – not perfect justice.

Session I discussion topics

The viability of connecting nuclear weapons, nuclear energy issues, and climate change? There wasn't agreement on either the strength of the linkages between these sectors or that the approach is a good tactic choice in disarmament debates. Various forms of linkage were noted in discussion, including:

- The international community might learn from the experience of nuclear disarmament, since the challenge of eliminating nuclear weapons is less difficult than reversing and remedying climate change. Achieving progress on the one should teach useful lessons for tackling the other.
- For the WCC, what resonated about this paper are the Just Peace elements – earth/climate, marketplace/economics, peoples/global threats – and the effort to show links between these issues.
 - The link between using nukes and adding to climate change is certainly clear.
 - The Ecumenical Call to Just Peace identifies nuclear weapons and climate change – the most-global of threats – as misuses of energy for the purpose of building *weapons of mass destruction* and to support *lifestyles of mass extinction*.
- In conflict-ridden regions with active militaries, the risks of nuclear proliferation may tend to rise. If nuclear technology has also been disseminated for power plants, proliferation becomes even more of an option. Given the economic, environmental and resource crises predicted to increase during climate change, the pressures may well induce conflicts that include armed violence.
- What is the underpinning for various forms of proliferation? Capital investment, strategies for economic growth and the creation of wealth. Nuclear energy projects and nuclear arsenals continue to grow partly because, in both sectors, there is money to be made by suppliers and contractors in the industries involved.
- There is a dilemma in distinguishing between nuclear energy use and nuclear weapons – these are connected as parts of one technocratic and economic system, a transnational hegemonic regime. They are linked by governments, science and industry. Their economic dimension contributes to the unequal wealth and economic growth in the world. In addition, they have some of the same effects on human beings, society and the environment. This ethical critique of interconnectedness has to be a part of the conversation.
- (The WFC paper is weak on political and historical analysis. It makes little mention of the role of international institutions or of international law. It is polemical in approach and somewhat skewed toward idealistic notions.)

Reframe, or redefine, the debate around nuclear disarmament in other ways. Walker would focus on questions of identity that are linked to the possession of nuclear weapons. Observations and discussion on this point:

- As an expression of their owner's identity, nuclear weapons are *perverse, offensive* and, in this context, *un-Christian*.

- Address nuclear-armed “identity” as an issue of *strangeness* or *estrangement*.
 - The strangeness of using nuclear weapons.
 - That modern societies are still threatening to kill each other in the millions.
 - The sheer oddity of “weapons of mass destruction”. Believing WMDs have a place in society? Tragi-comic. Dinosauric.
 - Shouldn’t we be moving on? Find ways to do that. Link to morals and ethics, and more.
- The case of the UK is instructive of an attribute that appears to take hold in nuclear-weapon states – call it *self-love...narcissitic* in nature...a pre-occupation with status...with not being called weak on defense.
 - The UK is not directly threatened by another nuclear-weapons state. It is heavily indebted and faced with a range of unmet national priorities. Yet it continues to invest heavily in its nuclear force.
 - Many citizens and leaders do not “believe” in nuclear weapons, yet the nuclear status is protected, involving aspects of the national culture as well as military-industrial interests and infrastructure.
 - This is largely about self identity, and “who we think we are” (e.g. Britain wouldn’t dream of getting rid of nukes while France has them).
 - Britain does not like nuclear weapons, but is firmly tied to the idea of possessing nuclear weapons and does not want to get rid of them, even while it can’t imagine actually using them.
 - In India, it was said, there is a sense of being in love with possessing of nuclear weapons, but not even being able to imagine ever actually using them.
- The very notion of “security” is linked to identity and can become defined in part by having nuclear weapons. To change national identity is a profound change.
- Nuclear weapons are also the ultimate response to the fear, enmity and anxiety a nation may harbor towards certain other countries.
- Even the normal use of the term “weapon” is misleading and inadequate for nuclear arms. Nukes are much more than a weapon. Weapon is a euphemism here. We become immune by adopting the term. Nukes are *instruments of annihilation*. A new terminology is needed.
- The question to ask nuclear-weapon-state governments is:
 - Can you imagine using nuclear weapons?
 - If so, on whom?
- Debating nuclear armaments in terms of security is conventional; debating them in terms of identity is not.

Why is Scotland so anti-nuclear? Part of the reason is the historic sensibility that has developed from being subjected to domination and other impositions because of outside forces. Part is due to

church and civil society opposition in recent decades. The Blair government avoided Scottish concerns during the debate on Trident renewal. The Scottish National Party has made removal of the UK nuclear weapons a priority issue. Scotland's current approach to foreign policy is similar to its Nordic neighbors.

Understanding Iran's nuclear posture. At present Iran's behavior is best understood in relation to the development of a nuclear weapons program or threshold capability as a response to internal, regional and international instability and pressures.

The utility of nuclear weapons. The utility of nukes in national military strategies is generally going down. The trend is partially reflected in current adjustments in nuclear doctrines.

The Issue in the Light of Faith – Security Threats Related to Climate Change, Energy Trends and Nuclear Arms

Presenter: Dr Rosalee Velloso Ewell, Theological Commission, World Evangelical Alliance

Author: Rev Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, Global Task Force on Nuclear Weapons, World Evangelical Alliance

[See Appendix for full text of this four-part resource paper, "The Issue in the Light of Faith"]

An over-riding question. The over-riding question in the light of faith seems to be: How seriously do we take our identity as Christians? Related points from the paper by Wigg-Stevenson:

- We must engage in conversations about global threats with authenticity and distinctiveness.
- "We live as a people daily condemned, aligned with those who gain no reward from the world as it is."
- There are so many unknowns that propel the culture of fear, and prompt governments and Christians to do certain things and to respond in certain ways.
- Do we remember that the only fear we need have is the fear of God?
- Key questions to keep in mind:
 - What is the content of our hope?
 - What do we hope for?

A main challenge. One of the main challenges of the seminar is how to create a new mobilization of our churches on nuclear disarmament in ways that exercise faith?

- Anger at the state of affairs can mobilize and, when people get angry, that can result in changes.
- You can read the Bible in a pragmatic way, or you can also see the anger and emotion in it.
- Grounding one's claims in faith raises difficult questions in a pluralistic context – how can one make faith claims in such a way that one doesn't claim exclusivity on the basis of ethics, but offer insights as one contribution to shared ethics?

"Sustaining the cycle of life" is a key concept. How do we name in a productive way that pursuing and possessing nuclear WMDs move humankind away from the responsibility for living in a sustainable manner? Move us away from faith?

- Christian religion has so often played a role in the mass atrocities of our era, the destruction of life – and many of these weapons are owned by so-called Christian countries. This is a crisis of our Christian identity.
- Thinking about the connections between nuclear power and weapons – what is the concern of people of faith? It goes back to a very real articulation around the value we place on every human life.
- We must look at the civilian nuclear fuel cycle as we do the fuel cycle for nuclear weapons – how it is harming or helping the people involved or affected. The growth of uranium mining means that, from the beginning of the cycle, there are deep questions about what the process is doing to people.
- We think we are the only beings in this universe that have the potential to destroy (a part of) it.
 - Is it possible that humans can thwart the will of God – if the will of God is for life?
- We hold both the insights and vision that science has given us, plus the deeply held value of respecting all life. We understand that all of creation is not just for utilitarian value for human beings.
 - This cosmic context is what really brings together the issue of climate change, nuclear weapons, and nuclear power plants. They all are at least put at serious question in terms of how human beings are respecting that cosmic order or not.
 - We can't enter the conversation from the perspective of the problem, but have to enter the conversation from the perspective of the vision, of the possibilities.
 - Isn't it true that the basic motif of the conquest of nature has to do with the same greed and fear that leads to nuclear weapons?
 - How do we wrestle with the reality that we can't control the results of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons?

Fearlessness of love. The use of the word 'realism' is striking (in 'Light of Faith' resource). It creates a paradigm. There is a contradiction between the 'fearlessness of love' of 1st John versus the fearfulness of self-love that results in nuclear weapons.

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Session 2 – Delegitimize Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: Exposing Myths, Embracing Human Security and Humanitarian Law

Presenter: Ward Wilson, Senior Fellow, Monterey Institute

The discourse and logic often used to support the retention of nuclear weapons – and to resist efforts aimed at their complete and irreversible elimination – are built upon false myths and flawed assumptions. These deeply-rooted beliefs constitute key political and intellectual obstacles to concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament, and the extent to which they are routinely

espoused within the states and alliances that possess nuclear weapons seems divorced from the groundswell of support for a global legal ban on their use and possession.

The myths around which the retention discourse has been constructed confer upon nuclear weapons a series of positive attributes that are supposedly in line with the national interest of nuclear armed states. They also portray the existence of nuclear arsenals as an element that contributes not only to the security of their possessors but also to broader international stability.

The reality, however, is that nuclear arms are clumsy, expensive weapons in a category of their own that are not ideally suited for any military task except for the rapid killing of tens of thousands of human beings.

During this session, two main myths were highlighted:

Nuclear deterrence is effective. Perhaps the most deeply entrenched myth among certain sectors that see value in the possession of nuclear weapons is that nuclear deterrence is a sound doctrine that contributes to international stability. In short, advocates of nuclear deterrence doctrine believe that the mere threat of a nuclear attack by a nuclear weapons state is sufficient to dissuade would-be attackers out of fear of unbearably destructive retaliation.

During the session, several historical examples were presented as evidence of instances in which non-nuclear weapons states and non-state actors have not been deterred in confrontations with states possessing nuclear arsenals. Likewise, the validity of deterrence doctrine as an explanation for periods of peaceful international relations that are often attributed to it was refuted. Factors contributing to periods of peace include legal and moral progress, cultural integration and economic interdependence. Conflicts are not resolved by nuclear deterrence. They are more likely to be suppressed by it, deepened or played out in other forms.

Nuclear weapons cannot be ‘dis-invented’. Often referred to as the ‘genie out of the bottle’ argument, this myth is based on the fatalistic belief that the use and possession of nuclear weapons cannot be curbed as they have already been tested, used, modernized and are fixtures in the security architecture of various states and alliances. According to this argument, it is far too late and unrealistic to consider outlawing this type of weapon since it is not plausible to rid the world of the wherewithal and technical expertise to produce them.

This myth is countered, not with the naïve assertion that nuclear weapons can be ‘dis-invented’ but rather by realizing that, although it is true that the expertise to produce such weapons cannot be done away with, this fact is essentially irrelevant. There are multiple examples of technology that goes away when no longer useful. There are also types of weapons whose use has become taboo, although they were once seen as legitimate in the conduct of warfare. The same could conceivably happen with nuclear weapons once their essential political and military uselessness, as well as their lack of moral justification, becomes clear to those that still embrace them.

It is thus imperative for advocates of nuclear disarmament to expose, challenge and delegitimize the prevalent myths that seek to rationalize the irrational threat to human existence posed by the possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is crucial to offer an alternate story – one that reveals the weak foundation on which beliefs that perpetuate the notion of effective nuclear deterrence are based. In this sense, the nuclear weapons debate must be reframed using compelling moral and pragmatic arguments in order to gradually deconstruct the feeble intellectual edifice that supports the retention of these instruments of mass destruction.

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Session 3 – Reframing the Debate: Revive the Moral Imperatives, Together

Fr Tim Duffy, Justice and Peace Commission, CCB Scotland;

Steve Hucklesby, Joint Advocacy Team, Methodist-Baptist-United Reformed Churches, UK

Nuclear force. Nuclear weapons have catastrophic power to annihilate life. They cause indiscriminate destruction to people, property and much more. Nuclear weapons leave long-term effects. Thus, nuclear weapons and nuclear power and even technology are malignant. Despite their destructive potency, nuclear weapons are still seen by governments as the ultimate means to deter aggressors.

On the one hand, the link between nuclear possession and threats is part of social-system thinking, a mentality which has altered human relations and raises critical moral issues. On the other hand, the debate on nuclear ethics, morals and faith has come a long way with the benefit of many and various thinkers. For example, Simone Weil has described force as that factor that turns man into a thing. We now have a matrix – cognitively, morally and spiritually – within which to assess nuclear weapons and their possession.

Imperatives. An *imperative* is meant to be strong, but it has to be right and just as well as strong. It should serve to guide “usable power”- but the power of nuclear weapons contradicts the gospel of peace, and moves all things human out of the reality of life into a reality of death. In *Gaudium et Spes*, the power to master and use indiscriminate force emerges as “a crime against God.”

Reframing the moral imperative does not mean getting rid of it. It means reframing the choice between life and death. Choosing between “life and prosperity, death and adversity” (Deuteronomy 30:15-20) is central in the moral choice between the use, or non-use, of nuclear force. In light of faith and human existence, the “enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons and their purpose as a weapon of terror is inimical to the gospel of peace demonstrated in the life of Jesus.”

The church and nuclear arms. Over time, churches have held different on the matter of nuclear weapons. In 1982 the Scottish Bishops declared that “if it is immoral to use these weapons it is also immoral to threaten their use.” In 2011 Scotland’s Keith Cardinal O’Brien argued that his challenge to nuclear weapons is part of the Catholic “pro-life stance that has human dignity at its very core.” There are also many instances where churches have worked together against nuclear weapons. Yet they have also faced criticism that there is a “doctrinal imperative” to free the world of nuclear weapons. Advocacy challenges include:

- **Working together:** Cooperation is an important approach. Given the enormity of the problem, working together is critical and urgent. This means working across different faiths as well as among different churches. To do so is challenging yet it can be a powerful witness. It requires a fundamental moral mindshift. It means abandoning self-defence, reflecting on the context together and taking risks in order to challenge.

The Christian perspective transcends denomination, and calls us to share in the strength of working together.

- **Church versus government:** Governments are the main duty bearers to address the issue of nuclear arms. They are responsible for security; churches are not. Thus, some accept nukes in order to achieve a ‘greater good’, namely, survival. Others accept it because unilateral disarmament is seen to be too risky.

Considering the political dynamics, the obligations, and the fact that governments are responsible for making decision on our behalf raises questions:

- How can we walk in their shoes, face the real difficulties and understand the tough compromises?
- Is the church involved fully? The question is whether churches have the capacity in terms of the full awareness of the problem to be able to engage the government effectively. To enable the churches to act, the importance of capacity needs to be taken into consideration.
- How do churches have discussions with government that are more honest all-round?
- **New threats to humanity.** It is vital to re-examine the agency of greed that characterises war and related technology. The urgency of the moment is that, scientific research could ultimately generate even greater threats to humanity than nuclear weapons. The world struggles with the nuclear phenomenon, but a post-nuclear time may not be free of extreme dangers either. Dangerous weapons which can pose new threats to life may be in the offing, hence the need also to define who and what is the enemy – with a view to reframe human relations.
- **Moral questions:** The existence of nuclear threats to humanity raises serious moral questions. We need to reframe the moral imperative, revive it, and work out ways to address the problem. Ethical question are not separate questions. If these are separated out, a scientific approach would be to pursue the question of ‘why’?

The current proliferation cannot be seen only from a qualitative and technological viewpoint. It is also political and social.

In faith we know that technology is either a means to an end or an end in itself, whereas faith is the ultimate concern of reliance on God that can form the basis for framing the moral imperatives.

- **Deterrence versus ‘obey and live’:** Deterrence – especially when viewed as self-defence – is also questionable when it justifies the destruction of life. This is “an affirmation of death.” This cannot be taken as the way to life.

God’s call is “If you obey the commandments of the Lord your God that I am commanding you today, by loving the Lord your God, walking in his ways, and observing his commandments, decrees, and ordinances, then you shall live.” The fundamental moral questions, the urgency, the dangers of scaling up – these have to be addressed with a consistent message of peace, which is inseparable from the issue of genuine security.

The Issue in the Light of Faith – Reframing the Debate: Revive the Moral Imperatives, Together

The Christian response includes raising issues pertinent to the call for the world to be safe. How does this inform us and shape our actions:

- What sort of people is God calling us to be?
- What “practices” are we expected to learn that inform our approaches to indiscriminately lethal weaponry?

- It is important to conceive that “A threat is not a non-violent act.”

[See appendix for “The Issue in the Light of Faith: Reviving the Moral Imperatives, Together”]

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Session 4 – Security in a Nuclear-weapon-free World, What Needs to Shift Now?

Presenter : Ernie Regehr, senior fellow, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Shifting Discussions. In recent years the discussion has shifted from the idea of whether or not to get to zero (nuclear weapons) to how to maintain security in a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is important that this has become a part of the mainstream conversation. It is a serious topic, that requires serious attention. While a nuclear weapons free world may not arrive today, the world has already changed since the highest levels of armament. It is also imperative to remind those engaged in these discussions that not all conflicts must be resolved in the world before it abolishes nuclear weapons- and to use the 1925 Geneva Protocols and their ban on chemical and biological weapons as a key example of this.

Security Components for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. There are a number of key components necessary to consider in a secure nuclear-weapon-free world. These include:

- Deterring nuclear breakout
- Implications of deterrence by conventional weapons
- Alternatives to deterrence, alternative ways to arrange global security
- The inherent discriminatory aspects of the NPT are not sustainable indefinitely.
- There is a growing fear that non-state actors will acquire nuclear weapons
- The end of the cold war offers the possibility to restructure global security relationships.
- Disarmament is transformative – it is not just the world that must change, we must remember that disarmament changes the world.

Hedging argument, deterring breakout. Nuclear weapons will not be un-invented, but they can be disarmed. However, as long as these weapons are perceived as having any value whatsoever, there will always be those who will want to hedge against potential breakout from the disarmament regime. The idea of virtual deterrence through the monitored maintenance of reconstititional capacity is one that has been suggested as a way to hedge bets. However, others argue that virtual arsenals reinforce the mentality that nuclear war is possible at any time. Maintaining the possibility of nuclear deterrence whether by existing nuclear weapons or virtual nuclear weapons also means maintaining a global competitive order, instead of a global cooperative security order.

A nuclear-weapon-free world will have to have the means of dealing with a nuclear threat- there will always be some kind of proliferation pressures. Therefore there is a need for supply side controls, including:

- Verified elimination of stocks
- Verified dismantlement of weapons
- Verified prevention of diversion.

Controlling supply *and* demand. In addition to supply-side controls, a reduction of demand must be created. This is best achieved through alternative security arrangements. In dealing with Iran, there is currently very little consideration given to reducing the demand-side. If the international community cannot deal with the Iran issue, then we can forget about disarmament anytime soon. Without devaluing nuclear weapons, both militarily and politically, their disarmament will never be fully realised. The currency of nuclear weapons only has value in certain spheres, and recalling this helps us to devalue them further.

To reduce the demand for nuclear weapons a shift must be made in global power relations that refer to the security needs of their former adversaries. The ‘others’ security needs must become part of ‘our’ security equation.

What role for the churches? In the near term, churches are eminently qualified to address these questions. Like politicians, we may not be experts, but we are obligated to contribute to discussions. We do not speak beyond our competence, but within our responsibility.

There is a pastoral role for churches in this as well. We must remember that responsibility for ministry to all victims, regardless of whether they had a role in creating the problem themselves.

The other 95 percent. For the 95-percent of states, how different is a nuclear-weapon-free world? There would be new scope to reform the relationships between the nuclear-weapon states, and scope to reallocate resources that nuclear weapons require to other, beneficial investments. There is a need to examine and advocate for conventional restraints, as well, as part of the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world. We should also consider that the evolving global security architecture is one that is not just related to nuclear weapons, or to any military capacity at all – it is increasingly political, economic and technological.

Security sign-posts in a post-nuclear-weapon world. Pre-eminence by US in conventional armaments will not be the basis of new relationships between US and China, or US and Russia. Sustainable security will require, *inter alia*:

- Conventional restraint, not conventional escalation, to augment the move to nuclear zero. *For your own security you have to enquire into the security needs of your adversary* (Gorbachev). This was a key shift that ended the Cold War. The huge USSR conventional advantage had to be reduced in order to remove the US-led nuclear threat to the USSR. (See the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, now broken by NATO’s ABM program). Stability in the context of lowest possible armaments is a key aim of Article 26 of UN Charter.
- *Reassurance* rather than deterrence.
- Affirm pluralistic world of different kinds of systems, where one system doesn’t view the other as threat.
- Regional sufficiency of arms.
- See the *military role as preventing conflict* and war, rather than propagating. Reject the idea that the main role of the military is to defeat one’s enemies.
- Pursue non-offensive military structures and postures, and non-provocative policies.
- Create conditions where *the idea of going to war* with your neighbours and putative adversaries is not conceivable.

Questions to keep considering.

- How do we deal with a non-rational political debate in such a powerful place as the U.S.?
- How can the conversation within the U.S. change? Would it help to hear from allies that U.S. military dominance is not helpful to their security?
- Is there a way for Northeast and Southeast Asia to speak together on this issue? To affirm their interdependence?
- How can U.S. (or UK, or French...etc) exceptionalism under international law be challenged?
- Are European austerity measures, or U.S. budget deficits, the best way to move forward for a nuclear-weapon-free world?
- Is there a role for the churches in creating cultural exchanges and understanding between the U.S. and China? Playing a similar role to the one played during the Cold War?

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Session Notes for Advocacy Workshop

Session 5 – Orienting Ourselves: Current Plans, Strategic Positions and Shared Potential

The primary purpose of Session 5 was for seminar participants to share highlights of the different advocacy strategies and initiatives being implemented by the groups they represented. Shared insights cover the work carried out in relation to issues such as NATO nuclear policy, NPT status and shortcomings, deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), building NWFZs (Africa, Northeast Asia, Mideast) and engagement with legislators and parliaments. Highlights include:

IKV PaxChristi. Susie Snyder described the organization's engagement with the Dutch Parliament. Key initiatives being pursued include a cross-party unanimous motion telling the Dutch government that nuclear weapons are not needed to guarantee the country's security, as well as a campaign to make nuclear weapons illegal in the Netherlands.

Project Ploughshares. Cesar Jaramillo spoke of the *Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention* project, which has been endorsed by more than 550 Order of Canada recipients, and was instrumental in the passing of a historic Motion by the Senate and House of Commons in 2010. The Motion urges the Canadian Government to endorse the UN Secretary General's 5-point plan for nuclear disarmament. Project Ploughshares has actively supported CNWC and has taken on the role of content coordinator the project's website.

CNS Fellow. Ward Wilson highlighted the importance of divesting from corporations that are, directly or indirectly, supporting research and manufacturing of nuclear weapons or their components. Susie Snyder explained that, in coordination with ICAN, a report would be released in 2012 identifying companies from different countries that are involved in the production cycle of nuclear weapons, which could be used as a starting point for divesting strategies.

Pax Christi International. Paul Lansu said that it was very important to engage not only political parties, but also the general population in efforts to rid countries like Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Belgium of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in their territory under NATO nuclear-sharing agreements.

Pat Gaffney pointed out that it was important for Pax Christi UK to engage Church leadership to more actively voice their support for nuclear disarmament as the Church has been essentially silent on this topic since 2006.

Marie Dennis informed participants that Pax Christi USA was producing a report on US tactical nuclear weapons deployed on European soil in order to raise awareness on this issue in the United States. She also said that Pax Christi would pursue engagement of the Holy See mission at the UN on the topic of nuclear disarmament.

Peter Mbae explained that there was little awareness of matters related to nuclear disarmament in Africa and it was therefore very important to engage governments and civil society on this issue. He further suggested that the risks related to the use of nuclear energy could be an 'entry point' to start discussions on this issue.

University of Waterloo. Ernie Regehr highlighted the tradition of letters/statements from Church leaders on specific topics related to nuclear disarmament, such as NATO strategic concept and reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals. He also spoke of the annual all-party parliamentary forum held to mark the adoption of the unanimous motion in the Canadian Parliament urging the government to actively support nuclear disarmament.

WCC. Jonathan Frerichs explained that, although the World Council of Churches has no obvious parliament to work with as an immediate interlocutor, its disarmament work includes support for member church and partner initiatives aimed at the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from European soil.

Asia-Pacific Centre for the Integral Study of Life. Yong-Bock Kim described the geopolitical impact in Northeast Asia of the six-party talks aimed at finding a resolution to security concerns arising from North Korea's nuclear-weapons program.

Baptist, Methodist, United Reformed Churches, UK. Steve Hucklesby said that it was important to bring together various church denominations in the UK under a 'now is the time to be active on nuclear disarmament' mentality. He further suggested that it was important to seek engagement with the UK NPT delegation in advance of the review cycle that is to begin with the 2012 Preparatory Committee.

Church of Scotland. David Bradwell offered background information on the referendum on Scottish independence that is likely to be held by 2015. He explained that there were still some questions about the exact nature of the referendum, such as (1) whether the referendum will be on full independence or giving more powers to the Scottish government and (2) whether the Scottish Parliament can call the referendum independently or it requires Westminster's acquiescence.

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Session 6 – Assessing Ourselves: Building Capacity within a Networked Approach

“I have a dream”. The morning meditation included mention of a Hindu Carbon Reduction Initiative in Scotland, and of the many people who see themselves as Scottish Hindus, Scottish Muslims, and Scottish Sikhs. In the session that followed, participants were invited to share hopes and expectations in this field:

- The vision of calling nuclear-weapon-states to account. Global community increasingly expects such governments to discharge their responsibilities. They are being watched.
- I live under a nuclear umbrella. Its leaky, its clumsy and does not work. I am obliged to do something, and I can help re-create the world. I won't vote for those who promote nukes, won't fight in a war where they are used; will not invest in corporations involve.
- The (lack of) moral legitimacy required in this field – who is filling in the gaps in “ethics”? We settle for relativism - my “ethics” are not the same as your “ethics”. Different “schools of ethics” need to be in active dialogue.
- Engage in more dialogue with all parties involved. Governments expect to hear from us, from civil society.
- Focus on “victims” and on their stories, direct and indirect.
- Need for a global Kairos on nuclear weapons – a moment of truth and change. Live out our faith stance against the powers that are based on nukes. Seize the opportunity presented by the 2013 WCC Assembly in Northeast Asia.
- Mostly you have to confront power, demand change and bring actions for change. A compelling vision is for broad civil society action including churches, universities and other institutions, to divest from nuclear weapons contractors and financiers.
- When the issue is not visible we become silent.
- What is really behind the policies and motivations of the possessors of nuclear weapons?
- Who decides on what is good and what is bad?
- Spiritual dimensions and depth must be integrated in our work on nuclear disarmament. The Bible calls people to choose between life and death.
- Re-think basic values of our churches – not to be overwhelmed by pragmatism or secularism.
- Need to include perspectives of ordinary people.
- How to re-tell the story in a way that breaks through the untruths we have faced for so long, a story that can be owned by many people, and that brings us forward.
- Generate conversations among people of faith and leaders that tackle issues and untruths.
- Current climate is open for possible real disarmament.
- Work for disarmament has been effective.

- Create the climate for a breakthrough. Breakthroughs come unexpectedly when change is needed, e.g. from Gorbachev and other leaders in late 1980s.
- Struggle between “multilateralism” and “unilateralism”.
- We have to create platforms in which politicians can operate. Churches must enter and sustain dialogue with decision-making bodies.

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis of ecumenical advocacy including Ecumenical No-Nukes Net

Strengths

- Has global representation, an existing constituency and channels for communication, education, etc.
- Long-term witness and well-developed responses (theology and policy).
- Sophisticated moral and legal argumentation.
- Outstanding record of challenging the soul of government (e.g. anti-Apartheid, human rights, giving international voice to people’s stories).
- WCC played decisive role in advocating for the rights of the Korean people, for rapprochement, for de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula and against nuclear weapons in East Asia.
- Able to draw on own traditions and work in partnership with or service to other traditions.
- Recognition that ecumenical movement is only one part of broad global movement.
- Capacity to network with faith-based and non-faith-based networks and cooperate in working for change.
- Possibility of interfaith work on common campaign – where there is a common objective (for example, peace and Article 9)
- WCC has the capacity to be seen and heard.

Weaknesses

- Diminishing resources for ecumenical work of churches.
- Need to strengthen connections and exercise solidarity with civil movements.
- Level of interfaith work not up to where it should be – lack of structure and intensity, difficulties of collaboration between different organizational or leadership models.
- Various regions of the world may not be represented, depending on the issue.
- May be disconnected from potential allies, e.g. Religions for Peace.

- Nuclear abolition is not yet an immediate and general agenda item – the issue could go in many directions.
- Need multi-faith group working on nuclear weapons that sets direction together/thinks together.
- WCC sometimes seen as “threat”.
- Failure to differentiate between awareness-raising, campaigning and policy work.
- Need for reality checks versus priorities.
- How to focus on USA, especially from Global South perspectives.

Opportunities

- Diverse courses of action are available and possible.
- NPT Preparatory Committees 2012-14 and NPT Review Conference in 2015.
- Respond with renewed urgency to increased scenarios of possible use of nukes.
- The misplaced trust that nuclear weapons deliver security
- Changing opinion within NATO about whether nukes are necessary for security and substantial opposition among the publics of NATO countries.
- Substantial ‘ally’ for disarmament in Germany.
- Democratization in Middle East may work to call governments to account.
- Economic crises may mean renewed scrutiny of vast military expenses, especially nukes which are useless against critical global problems.
- Bringing moral issues to bear on the discussion of budget priorities.
- Interconnectedness of the agenda for Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation, and Just Peace. Convergence of struggles in different areas; strength and potential in a diverse civil society response.
- 130 governments now vote for Nuclear Weapons Convention at the UN.
- UK government may be held to action by the global community.
- Moral illegitimacy and “poison” arguments – there is an opportunity to take responsibility for defining and rejecting the weapons on these terms.
- Address decision-makers. Influence policy with moral guidance and ethical discourse.
- Listen to and talk about stories from grassroots.
- Divestment information is available, offering new scope for widespread divestment from nuclear corporations and the banks that finance nuclear business.

- Support those who break the silence.
- Reiterate and illustrate that nukes are a matter of life and death.
- Deep spiritual reflection on nuclear issues is needed and possible.
- With all the openings for action, it could be ‘kairos’ moment.

Threats

- When a major issue goes unresolved for a long time, it becomes difficult to promote the solution as urgent (and even necessary)?
- World may be condemned to suffer the consequences of the existence of nuclear arsenals and strategies – and to live under the threat of nuclear war – for a long time.
- Uncertainty about where USA policy will go—toward more belligerency and defensiveness, or towards further reductions? This one state plays a pivotal role in either case.
- Decisions now by nuclear weapons possessors have long-term consequences; there can be long delays in effecting change.
- Proliferation could happen without recognition.
- Explicit rejection of nuclear weapons convention language by P5 governments.
- Is there a tendency for climate change and ‘climate justice’ to become *the* global pre-occupation, at the expense of focused attention to other global issues such as nuclear weapons even if the issues are linked.

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Sessions 7 and 8 – Member and Network Advocacy: Partnerships and Planning for Specific Steps Forward

The final sessions aimed to link priorities, to share plans and to identify opportunities on the calendar through 2013 and beyond. Topics for the session included: church and multi-religious confidence-building measures for a NWFZ in NE Asia in the lead-up to the 2013 WCC Assembly in Busan, Korea; steps toward removal of the nuclear umbrellas over NE Asia and Europe; next steps for the removal of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons; faith-based action on the Middle East NWFZ; more ‘whither the NPT?’, or the need to focus on other mechanisms; how churches can make their own contribution and add value to the ICAN campaign and the push for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Areas for action – Busan and beyond

Some key points of discussion arising from this session:

1.1 Inter-faith dialogue

Since the WCC Assembly is meeting in Asia, a focus on inter-faith and multi-faith action would be appropriate. The general direction could be to explore and promote the contribution of religions to crossing barriers and promoting peace.

1.2 Nuclear umbrellas

NE Asia and Europe are the two regions that come under the so-called 'positive security assurances' offered by nuclear umbrellas. The umbrella countries consist of 28 European countries, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea plus others who have accepted this form of positive security assurance. We can make the point that if you live in one of these 45 'umbrella' countries then your country is content and complicit with threatening to use and using nuclear weapons against others. New Zealand has explicitly rejected the status of being protected by the US nuclear umbrella.

A complicating factor is that Japanese and Lithuanian governments have suggested that if there is no nuclear umbrella then they would 'go nuclear' themselves.

- Therefore, confidence in other security agreements needs to be built up simultaneously with efforts to remove the nuclear umbrella.
- Declining the protection of the umbrella will be a forthcoming World Court Project initiative.

1.3 Nuclear energy

Various nations (and churches) are connected by the uranium fuel chain. Consider creating networks between churches and civil society organizations in uranium-exporting and uranium-importing countries. Those who lobby against uranium mining could form alliances with people living in uranium-importing countries, for example, between Australia and South Korea. South Korea has enrichment facilities; it imports raw uranium and then exports enriched uranium. Africa is the source of much uranium. Africa has a unique role to play in the nuclear fuel chain and therefore has a significant role in responding to the linkages between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

China plans to develop approximately 80 nuclear power plants. Given the secrecy surrounding Chinese nuclear energy programmes, serious safety issues are raised by this scale of investment in nuclear power.

1.4 Non-Proliferation Treaty

The current sequence of NPT meetings and main foci are Peaceful Uses (2012), Non-Proliferation (2013), Disarmament (2014), Review (2015).

The 2014 Preparatory Committee meeting is the deadline for nuclear-weapons states to report on the actions that they have taken under the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Africa has an important message on nuclear weapons and role to play on the related issues.

South Africa is one of the first countries to reject nuclear weapons after having developed and stockpiled them. The Pelindaba Treaty can be projected as a regional nuclear weapons convention. African civil society advocacy is very important in getting issues on to the agenda of the African Union and, as noted above, increasingly important with respect to the peaceful uses pillar of the NPT.

Specific plans and actions:

2.1 WCC Assembly, Busan, 2013

- The Assembly of the World Council of Churches will take place in Busan, South Korea, in October/November 2013. It is foreseen from various churches, including host churches and churches in the region, that the Assembly will issue a statement on nuclear concerns. Members of this network are welcome to provide inputs during preparations in 2013.

- The Busan Assembly will play a role in setting the ecumenical direction for the period 2013-2020 so, in preparing for Busan, attention is needed concerning the peace agenda over the coming decade.
- The next 'Asia Inter-religious Conference on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution' is scheduled to meet in 2013 (date and place to be decided). Three previous conferences have gathered a significant cross-section of Christian and Buddhist peace advocates and leaders. Each has denounced nuclear armaments and strategies in Northeast Asia.
- The National Council of Churches in the USA is planning a meeting to address what it means to live out the Ecumenical Call to Just Peace.
- Korean initiatives in 2012-13 include conferences and statements dedicated to promoting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy.
- Each of the issues below -- umbrellas, NATO, zones, NPT -- have parallels in Korea and NE Asia, and offer the prospect of inter-regional analysis and action.

2.2 Nuclear umbrellas

- Churches and related groups should consider ways of linking and joining together their calls to dismantle nuclear umbrella(s), including on-line exchanges and platforms.
- Make and publicize the point that by being under a nuclear umbrella, members of society including churches are accepting their government's use of the threat of nuclear weapons against other countries. To be under the umbrella is to offer implicit support for nuclear strategies. To accept such protection is also accept the ultimate prospect that nuclear weapon will be used by accident or by design, or figure in an act of terror.

2.3 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Weapons

- The tools used by churches/ecumenical organisations and other civil society groups can be shared within the five European countries that host TNW. For example, in democracies, if the majority declares that they do not want nuclear weapons, then their demands need to be widely known and taken into account in policy decisions.
- If Europe seeks to return NATO's TNWs to the US, this will have wider implications for US perceptions of Europe's responsibility for security. Already there is the sense in the US that if the Europe wants to keep the US nuclear weapons, they who should pay for the upgrade that is in progress.
- The American Friends Service Committee (US Quakers) facilitated direct actions at the counter-summit in parallel with the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago.
- We can continue to urge that NATO declaratory policy on the use of nuclear weapons must be aligned with the declaratory position outlined in the US Strategic Defence Review. Following US declaratory policy would help to move NATO forward from where alliance doctrine is currently.
- We need to develop cooperation with counterparts in France, including Pax Christi France. What will influence French thinking? Most likely it would be the economic

challenge of upgrading their arsenal. The question of whether, and how, nuclear weapons warp a nation's 'brain' may also be useful in stimulating debate.

2.4 Middle East WMD-free zone

- As steps are taken to begin discussion of the ME-WMDFZ, bring together civil society groups from countries in the region. There is little awareness in the region about the NPT and on nuclear issues generally.
- BASIC has a track-two consultation in the region in 2012. This is a follow-up to framework meetings on the issue in Amman.
- There is potential for moving forward with interfaith awareness-raising and advocacy around nuclear threats and disarmament. Such work could be reported at the NPT conference in 2015. This kind of initiative has to be on-going. So far, plans and actions in the Middle East have been modest for lack of funding and related capacity. In Northeast Asia the WCC Assembly serves as a catalyst for progress with the approach.

2.5 NPT

- IKV Pax Christi has a student delegation at the NPT 2012 and convenes daily NGO caucus.
- Challenge nuclear armed states on what they will accomplish and aspire to report to the NPT PrepCom of 2014.
- Reflect concerns from NGOs and churches in states that are contemplating the development of nuclear energy or increasing their investment in nuclear energy.

2.6 Other

- Pool our resources electronically.
- Korean Peninsula – If the six-party talks are reinvigorated it might be possible to consider a parallel, ecumenical, six-party conference in conjunction.

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Resource Materials

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'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons; New Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament', Pax Christi International, 2009, <http://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/publications/a-world-free-of-nuclear-weapons-new-opportunities-for-nuclear-disarmament>.
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Appendix: The Issue in the Light of Faith

Session 1 - Security Threats Related to Climate Change, Energy Trends, and Nuclear Arms

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, advisor, World Evangelical Fellowship
(in conjunction with Sessions 1-4)

Climate change, energy trends, and nuclear arms. That's some heavy business, indeed.

A few weeks ago, I attended a symposium on Christian responses to nuclear weapons. Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical members, we were asked to discuss how the church should engage such global threats. Our discussion yielded two primary, climate change, and poverty. In one of our breakout groups, which included responses: with authenticity, and distinctiveness.

In other words, we should not engage such crises as a reactionary people, defined by the problems we seek to overcome.

Rather, our first reaction to crisis should be to turn from the problem, and remember who we are, and the foundation on which we stand: *For no one can lay a foundation other than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ* (1 Cor 3.11).

So we first remember who we are: recipients of good news that came as an unmerited gift in God's own time: *that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures, and that he appeared to his followers* (1 Cor 15.3).

We remember that the world is God's: both in its present fallen order and its glorious and unshakable future to come; both in which we share: *When the perishable puts on the imperishable...then shall come to pass the saying that is written: "Death is swallowed up in victory."...The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ* (1 Cor 15.54-57). We believe that this work is complete and permanent (John 19.30).

We remember that we have, in faith, joined Christ in death and are reborn to live for him alone (2 Cor 5.14-15), built up as Christ's church (1 Pet 2.5) against which hell itself will fall (Mat 16.8), and bound (2 Cor 13.14) and quickened (2 Cor 3.6) by the Holy Spirit. We believe that we are thereby new creations, signs and citizens of a coming kingdom (Heb.12.22) – in a world to which we do not belong (John 17.15-16).

We remember that, from a kingdom perspective, the strategies that seem to work so well in the present fallen order, like wealth, power, and reputation, are doomed (Luke 6.24-26). But to those who benefit from such strategies – the unrighteous and other sin profiteers – our proclamation of the cross as God's strength revealed in weakness will necessarily seem stupid and ridiculous. (1 Cor 1.18). We live as a people daily condemned (Mark 8.34), aligned with those who gain no reward from the world as it is (e.g. Mat 5.2-11, 25.31-40; Luke 6.20-38).

We remember that we are a sent people, ambassadors (2 Cor 5.20) of God's unsearchable reconciliation (Col 1.20), making disciples through all the world (Mat 28.19-20, Phil 2.10-11).

And because we remember all these things, we may abide in the fearlessness of love (1 John 4.18). Our God is the Lord of both *well-being and calamity* (Isaiah 45.7) – so we may trust the promise that nothing – no thing – will be *able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord* (Rom 8.39), and that a people who trust wholly in love trust in that which alone will endure (1 Cor 13.8), which is God (1 John 4.8).

The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? (Ps 27.1)

Now. What were those problems, again?

Discussion questions:

- What are the most important elements of your faith journey – how has God found you, and how have you sought God?
- Have you experienced a particular calling from God around global crises like nuclear weapons? How has that calling taken shape? How does it give you strength?
- Describe – as a picture, not as a list of facts – the world for which you pray and labor. Who is in it? How do they live?

Session 2 – The Issue in the Light of Faith: Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, advisor, World Evangelical Fellowship

As conventional wisdom has it, since nuclear weapons can never be uninvented, we will need nuclear deterrence to prevent their use. The conventional wisdom is half right, because it realizes that humans must now live with the consequences of knowing how to build and deploy nuclear weapons. It was not a necessity of human history that our species learn how to release, with devastating effect, the energy that binds atomic material together. Having done so, however, we cannot now collectively unlearn it. The “Bomb in the mind,” as Jonathan Schell calls it, will always be with us. This once contingent knowledge has become a necessity of all future history. This is the condition for all our theological and ethical reflection.

The conventional wisdom on deterrence is fatally flawed, however. It conflates the necessity of the knowledge of the Bomb with the necessity of the primary tactic – deterrence – used to manage its destructive potential during its first historical era, the Cold War. It treats deterrence as inherent to the Bomb as an oak tree is inherent to an acorn. (An aside: we who oppose nuclear weapons should not disdain the moral good faith of many who advocate for deterrence – it is, after all, a moral good relative to its plausible alternatives, and it is certainly morally superior to nuclear war.)

But there is not a logically necessary connection between the Bomb and deterrence. There are many ways for a country to avoid being attacked with nuclear weapons. Threatening the use of nuclear weapons is one of them. In some circumstances, deterrence may well seem indispensable. But – and this is important – nuclear security and deterrence are not the same thing. The latter is one conceivable means to the former.

By decoupling knowledge of the Bomb and the strategy of deterrence, we clear the playing field of our moral imagination. We do not have to ask, “how can we morally manage this unavoidable condition of deterrence?” Instead, we can freely consider the fundamental knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons and ask, “toward what end should this knowledge be directed?”

This question reveals the morality of nuclear security to be, fundamentally, the morality of technological management: it is the question of what moral norms we believe should circumscribe this particular technology. Ironically, this is a rather quotidian task: every complex technology or body of knowledge is subject to management, official or otherwise. Technology gives us new capacities, and we conform these new capacities to what we believe are morally acceptable ends.

But technology management is not the usual mode of conceiving nuclear morality, especially within Christian communities. A far more common approach is to ascribe moral worth to one or more of the management strategies – disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control, counterproliferation, deterrence, etc. – as inherently moral. What is often overlooked in such arguments is that morality does not inhere to any particular strategy, but is actually conditional on the strategy’s efficacy in attaining another, morally normative goal. But because this goal is often assumed and rarely articulated, nuclear moral judgments often has the character of commenting on the quality of someone’s driving, without ever evaluating whether they are on a road that leads to their desired destination.

So, this is the fundamental question to those of us deliberating “in the light of faith”: what is the morally normative goal to which nuclear weapons technology should be oriented? (Anticipating the next session, I believe the answer is *nuclear non-use*; e.g., 1) that the morally normative goal of all nuclear technology management should be to ensure that no nuclear weapon is ever used, and 2) that the only macro-strategy capable of aspiring to this goal is abolition. But I get ahead of myself.)

Once we have clearly articulated that goal, we then have a basis and universal organizing principle for all subsequent engagement. Does this or that nuclear policy, practice, device, etc., build toward or detract from the morally normative end?

In taking these two questions as fundamental, we thereby do two things as Christians.

First, we isolate our core contribution to the nuclear weapons “issue” as essentially moral and theological in nature. This allows us to speak from our strength, which is not properly ours, but the wisdom of the cross, rather than as amateur nuclear planners.

Second, we establish with unequivocal clarity a standard that everyone can understand, including the people in the pews – *this* is what we are for, and why. We thus create a position for the *church*, not technocratic experts.

Discussion questions:

- What do you believe to be the fundamental moral norm toward which nuclear technology should be oriented (e.g. non-use, national security/sovereignty, great power stability, etc.)?
- What are the ethical strengths/weaknesses to positions that treat morality as inherent to a specific strategy of threat management: disarmament, deterrence, arms control, etc?
- What does an ethical alternative to deterrence require?

Session 3 – The Issue in the Light of Faith: Reviving the Moral Imperatives, Together

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, advisor, World Evangelical Fellowship

If the fundamental issue for Christian engagement in nuclear weapons (as suggested in the last session) is the morally normative end of nuclear technology, the question then is how we determine those ends.

The Just War tradition cannot be ignored as perhaps a singularly determinative arbiter of nuclear ethics for many Christians worldwide – though a robustly theological Just War tradition will acknowledge that it offers only a tiny fraction of Christian resources on war and peace, for it speaks only about the situations of last resort. And if we do not get lost in too-frequent use of Just War criteria as tick boxes for the purpose of legitimizing war, we can see that Just War is the (often futile) demand that even the practice of human violence be subject to the justice of God's coming kingdom.

Within traditional Just War loci, three points speak especially to nuclear weapons. The principle of discrimination precludes any use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians. And the principle of proportionality requires that the use of force be relative to the conflict – a situation that is difficult to imagine, given the power of modern nuclear weapons. For people already disposed to hate nuclear weapons, these arguments are enough. But serious nuclear technocrats who are paid to imagine worst-case scenarios can deploy hypothetical exceptional scenarios – an unforeseeable global war, with a military target far removed from non-combatants – that may, in fact, satisfy proportionality and discrimination. And these are the people who are in charge of the nuclear establishment, so we do ourselves no favor by not taking them seriously.

But the nuclear technocrats stumble, ethically speaking, when they devalue the taboo against nuclear use. The Just War demands consideration of macro-proportionality: that the good from a given action exceed the predictable harm. And there is simply no case to be made for the benefits of a given tactical situation, no matter how dire, outweighing the costs of rupturing a sixty-six-year-and-counting taboo against nuclear weapons as legitimate instruments of war. All strategic planners' justifications to the contrary give undue consideration to their own nation's exceptional circumstances, while diminishing the fact that there is a difference between an absolute norm and an exceptional norm. The use of nuclear weapons by a state actor in any circumstance would open a door that could not readily be shut, and through which hell itself could race. And it is this Just War standard, that good outweigh harm, that fixes an immobile and absolute moral norm against the use of nuclear weapons – a norm of non-use that can then be used as an operating principle for developing and evaluating policy.

Beyond the specific parameters of nuclear weapons ethics, however, our present climate raises broader concerns about Christian engagement in a world facing global, transnational crises. The popular apocalyptic imagination has certainly shifted from nuclear-only to a pantheon of world-ending phenomena – climate change, nano- and bioengineering, pandemics, resource scarcity, etc. In this context it is both right and good to treat nuclear weapons not only as an isolated ethical question but to situate Christian engagement in nuclear weapons in the broader concern of peacemaking in a globalizing era.

In the same text that seeded the Christian Just War tradition, St. Augustine described Christian engagement in human government as the pursuit of peace, which he defined as *tranquillitas ordinis*, or the tranquility of order. Our task is to conform our earthly social order, as best we are able within the confines of a fallen creation, to the perfect order of heaven. This work seems eminently timeless and applicable today. And though the crises attending globalization present unique challenges of complexity and scale, our heavenly marching orders remain the same: set to the job at hand, with the tools available, and with eyes fixed on a heavenly blueprint.

A final thought about moral imperatives: it is good and necessary for Christian organizations – the Holy See, WCC, WEA, etc. – to make moral pronouncements about the conduct of governments. But we all know that we have a hard enough time getting our congregations – or ourselves! – to behave according to the moral imperatives of personal holiness. And if a law

carved on stone by God's own finger couldn't compel perfect obedience, how much less so a resolution by our imperfect church bodies?

As we pursue our work, therefore, we might do well to remember the difference between moral imperatives of "thou shalt/not" and the morality of love and compassion – it's one thing to obey an ethical command to help "the poor," and quite another to respond in love to someone in need. Though both are moral impulses, our Lord's teaching – e.g. the parable of the Good Samaritan – seems to favor the latter. It's worth noting that this shift is really, really hard to make with nuclear weapons, which are potentialized threats that are invisible and unreal to most people's daily lives. So it is very difficult to put a face to the issue and enable a moral response grounded in the particularity of relationship and compassion, rather than the abstraction of imperative (however well-reasoned!).

Discussion questions:

- An ethic of nuclear non-use is only a first step; what other ethical prescriptions do various Christian traditions of war and peace place around nuclear weapons technologies (e.g. questions of environment and human health, financial cost, embedded assumptions of national prerogative, etc.)
- What does the tranquility of order look like in the context of globalization?
- What does it look like to think morally about nuclear weapons in terms of compassion and love, versus moral imperatives? Is it possible?

Session 4 – The Issue in the Light of Faith: Security in a Nuclear-weapon-free World – What Needs to Shift Now?

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, advisor, World Evangelical Fellowship

The movement toward a world without nuclear weapons will raise significant ethical questions. At lower numbers, for example, the strategic calculus around nuclear weapons shifts, and strips away the illusion that deterrence is based in threatening an adversary's military assets, rather than cities and population. Simply put, to get to zero we will have to go through a numerical phase of armaments that reveals the barbarism underneath deterrence's respectable Savile Row suit, and which is beyond Christian ethical sanction. Dealing with this will be critical – will it require a nuclear weapons convention, which would ban nuclear weapons, and thus at least relegate the threat to annihilate civilians to the level of implicit possibility, rather than stated nuclear doctrine? Furthermore, ethical evaluation of the end-state – a device of global governance that could predictably counter any nuclear breakout – will also be important. These, and other questions, must be seriously engaged.

On a broader level, as suggested in the previous session, we need to figure out how to pursue the work of pursuing *tranquillitas ordinis* in the midst of globalization. I think this merits some careful thought. Often, Christian activists can respond to problems with instincts that are drawn more from activist circles than from the church (I am the chief of sinners in this regard!). That is, confronted with a challenge, we resolve to get this or that petition signed, or this or that resolution passed, or lobby this or that official, or aspire toward action grounded in the notoriously ephemeral discourse of activism: "raise awareness," "take a stand," "speak out," "raise our voices," "advocate." But none of these tactics (such as they are) are adequately distinctive or authentic to who we are as Christians, or even less, the church.

Toward the end of authenticity and distinctiveness, then, I suggest a possible typology for considering the full breadth of gifts that Christians and the church have to offer in pursuing our work. The list is incomplete, but I hope it might be helpful for seeing the spectrum of goods that we might contribute.

Judicial: participating in public discussion and debate about nuclear weapons and analyzing policy proposals, as one stakeholder whose bottom line is the moral good and human flourishing to the glory of God, rather than any particular political, military, or economic interest. Tactical manifestations: scholarship and publication in secular arena, public debate, church leader/organizational advocacy in government/UN processes.

Prophetic: theatrical action and speech that seeks to reveal truth, indifferent to political calculus or efficacy. Tactical manifestations: breaking into a military base and hitting a bomber with a hammer until you get arrested (for example).

Pastoral: caring pastorally for people who exercise authority in nuclear matters (elected officials, scientists, military) helping them to engage moral arguments and their own conscience, and enabling them to exercise Christian faithfulness in their particular vocational context. Tactical manifestations: cultivating relationships of trust with politicians, holding convening space for groups to explore vocation.

Militant: employing the infrastructure and numbers of people in churches toward the end of nuclear weapons elimination, and discipling congregants as Christian citizens in this regard. Tactical manifestations: public protests, boycotts, divestment.

Irenic: Acting as ambassadors of gospel peacemaking and reconciliation to help address nuclear-related conflict. Tactical manifestations: Track II diplomacy to governments and religious leaders in nuclear hot-spots like Iran, DPRK.

Priestly: Intervening for peace and security. Tactical manifestations: personal and corporate prayer; dedicated times of worship and fasting for preservation from nuclear weapons and their abolition.

Sectarian: Retreat from the public arena to study the Scriptures, discuss as church bodies, and disciple one another in the theological significance of nuclear weapons. Tactical manifestations: church-focused publication and scholarship, development of discipleship and study materials.

Discussion questions:

- What will be the pressing theological/ethical questions related to nuclear weapons that Christians/the church will likely need to address in the next 5/10/20 years?
- What vision for the world does our faith compel us to seek? What structures are necessary for nuclear reductions/elimination? How do these structures complement or conflict with other pressing global structures (e.g., an expansion in nuclear power to address climate change would have profound consequences for proliferation)?
- Which types of engagement do you believe that you as an individual/organization/communion are called? Which gaps does that leave – and which partners or co-laborers are called to fill them?

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